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Abstract
Irony has a suspicious moral reputation, especially in popular media and internet culture.
Jonathan Lear (2011) introduces a proposal which challenges this suspicion and identifies
irony as a means to achieve human excellence. For Lear, irony is a disruptive uncanniness
which arises from a gap between aspiration and actualisation in our practical identity.
According to Lear, such a disruptive experience of ironic uncanniness reorients us toward
excellence, because it passionately propels us to really live up to that practical identity.
However, Lear’s understanding of irony is idiosyncratic and his proposal overlooks that
disruption often results from value incompatibility between different practical identities.
The disruption which follows from value incompatibility does not inherently reorient us
toward excellence. The point is exactly that achieving excellence in one practical identity
is sometimes incompatible with excellence in the other. Pace Lear, I do not identify this
disruptive experience as a central example of irony. Instead, I consider irony a virtuous
coping strategy for such disruption, because it introduces the necessary distance from our
moral imperfection to sustain practical deliberation and maintain good mental health.
Such virtuous irony negotiates a golden mean between too little disruption (complete
insensitivity toward one’s imperfection) and too much disruption (a complete breakdown
of practical deliberation and mental health). I argue that ironic media in popular culture
provide a rich source of such virtuous irony, which I demonstrate through analysis of
satirical examples.
Keywords JonathanLear .Value incompatibility .Moralperfectionism.Disruption . Irony .Echo
vs. pretence
1 Introduction
The moral status of irony is suspicious. Philosophers (e.g. Blackburn 1998; Kierkegaard 1989
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spineless whimsy. The usual suspicion is that irony equals detachment from moral responsi-
bility and earnestness. In defiance of these suspicions, Jonathan Lear (2011) boldly proposes
that we should cultivate irony to achieve human excellence. For Lear, irony is an uncanny
disruption of our practical identity which does not disorient us, but rather directs us toward
virtue.
Lear’s proposal is a welcome reassessment of irony’s morally suspicious reputation, while
‘disruption’ is a particularly fruitful concept to frame irony’s potential for virtue. Hence, Lear’s
account offers seminal avenues for a moral reinvestigation of irony, unavailable in other
philosophical accounts (e.g. Nehamas 1998). However, I will argue that what Lear calls
“anxious, uncanny longing” (2011, 117) is only irony in a peripheral sense, and, because his
proposal differs radically from other accounts, it fails to alleviate common moral suspicions
(see Bernstein 2016, 37).
Lear’s account is problematic because he insists that existentially relevant irony is radically
different from irony as a figure of speech, i.e. ‘communicative irony’ (Lear 2001, 5; passim).
This oversight is especially problematic because communicative irony is what most people
routinely conceive irony to be. At the same time, Lear’s understanding of communicative
irony as “saying the opposite of what one means” (2011, 6)—although classical and seminal
(see Vlastos 1991)—is outdated, and has long been rejected by philosophers working in
aesthetics (Currie 2006, 2011) and at the interface of philosophy and linguistics (Sperber
and Wilson 2012).
Lear’s account is indicative of how philosophers are often at cross-purposes when inves-
tigating irony, which is why there still much confusion and misunderstanding about the topic
(see Bernstein 2016, 1). In this article, I argue that the morally suspicious reputation of irony
unduly persists because the irony which is existentially and morally relevant has not been
primarily understood as an offshoot of communicative irony. Redressing this oversight, I do
not conclude that irony is by default morally virtuous. Yet, equally, irony is also not by default
morally suspicious. Rather, irony is a form of emotional distancing which can mediate the
unavoidable disruption of moral imperfection in our lives, when applied with the right
measure, in the right circumstances.
This article has four more sections. In section 2, I develop an overview of Lear’s account of
irony as uncanny disruption. Section 3 critiques the idiosyncrasy of Lear’s account by
providing an overview of different kinds of irony and introducing a new form of complex
communicative irony, which I call ‘ironic characters’. In section 4, I ague that ironic characters
can mitigate the disruption of moral imperfection. I challenge Lear’s proposal that disruption
inherently reorients us toward excellence. Instead, I introduce value incompatibility as an
unavoidable disruption in our moral lives, which risks breaking down practical deliberation
and compromise mental wellbeing. Section 5 concludes by framing the urgency of disruptive
value incompatibility in the context of globalized information technology.
2 Lear on Irony
For Lear, irony is an experience of disruption in our practical identity which reorients us
toward human excellence. Lear provides the example of ‘teacher’ as a practical identity, which
introduces norms that guide practical deliberation (2011, 4/11). Consider a university lecturer
who has fifty undergraduate essays to mark but resists the temptation of reducing work by
providing only superficial feedback, because that is not what a ‘teacher’ would do. According
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to Lear, human excellence requires that “we inhabit a practical identity well” (2011, 4). It does
not follow that we always know how to act in accordance with our practical identity. Instead,
Lear argues that achieving human excellence involves “disruption and disorientation” (2011,
14). In my example, the lecturer would be disrupted and disoriented if they were clueless about
what marking fifty essays has to do with ‘teaching’ and, equally, what it even means to be a
‘teacher’.
Such disruption is ironic when it “manifests an inchoate intimation that there is something
valuable about teaching” (Lear 2011, 19). In other words, the lecturer may not know what
‘teaching’ is, only that activities commonly associated with being a ‘teacher’ (like marking)
fall woefully short of the ideal; yet, they do intuit that such a valuable ideal exists. Therefore,
Lear calls ironic disruption an “experience of would-be-directed uncanniness” (2011, 19,
original emphasis). In such an uncanny experience, everything that was once familiar about
‘teaching’ has now become unfamiliar, but there is nonetheless an embryonic desire toward
excellence. Therefore, Lear identifies irony as “erotic uncanniness” (2011, 117, original
emphasis).
According to Lear, “[i]t is constitutive of human excellence that one develop a capacity for
appropriately disrupting one’s understanding of what such excellence consists in” (2011, 37).
For example, to achieve excellence as a ‘teacher’, the lecturer must harness the force of ironic
disruption to transcend received social understandings of teaching and tap into an otherwise
inaccessible direction toward human excellence (Lear 2011, 25). Although human excellence
does not involve experiencing such disruption all the time, we should cultivate “practical
wisdom about when it is appropriate to deploy irony” (Lear 2011, 30).
Lear’s account introduces a sense of existential disruption that is undoubtedly familiar. Just
think of academics who are at a loss about what it means to be a ‘teacher’ in a market
environment where students are consumers. The lecturer from my example may find them-
selves at loose ends because they are unsure what ‘keeping the customer satisfied’ has to do
with being a ‘teacher’ – but, equally, they do not know how else to be a ‘teacher’ given the
marketization of higher education. Although this experience is unsettling, Richard Bernstein
rightfully notes that there is something valuable about “an uncanny experience that provokes a
search for new direction” (2016, 45). In this respect, Lear frames his account as an “attempt to
use the force of disruption in a creative, poetic manner, instead of suffering from it or being
confused by it” (Sholl 2011, 9, my translation).
However, it is not entirely clear exactly how irony succeeds to overcome the mental
suffering or confusion of disruption. Lear acknowledges that “getting the hang of it does not
come that easily”, so irony is hardly a strategy that is readily available in practical deliberation
(2011, 31). Moreover, the nature and force of Lear’s irony is equally difficult to comprehend
without actually experiencing it. Although this gnomic quality is integral to irony on Lear’s
account, it means that only the initiated can grasp how irony directs us toward human
excellence. In section 4, I further argue that Lear’s account overlooks that achieving the ideal
of excellence is often not possible, as in the case of being a ‘teacher’ in a market environment,
which often involves compromising between ideal and reality. In those cases, irony is useful
not because it directs us to human excellence, but because it helps us deal with the disruption
of moral imperfection.
First, I move onto disputing that Lear’s uncanny disruption is really (a central form of)
irony. Therefore, Lear’s account fails to rebut common moral suspicions about irony in
philosophy and cultural criticism. Lear identifies the “contemporary cultural reception of
irony” as a “defense against getting rattled by one’s own commitments” (2011, 119). He
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specifically refers to the “ataraxia” on offer in Richard Rorty’s defence of the liberal ironist
(Lear 2011, 119). For Rorty (1989), an ironist is someone who knows that their central values
have been shaped by contingency (e.g. as opposed to my friend, I happened to grow up in a
Catholic family, but the situation could easily have been reversed). Aware of such unavoidable
contingency, the ironist is “never quite able to take themselves seriously” (Rorty 1989, 73–74).
Irony’s professed lack of commitment to values is morally suspicious. Simon Blackburn
dismisses Rotry’s ironist as a “weightless aesthete, to whom all real commitment is a subject of
joke or parody” and argues that if we are serious about ethics, “we can safely set the irony
aside” (1998, 290). The early Kierkegaard is similarly suspicious of irony, which he (following
Hegel) defines as infinite absolute negativity (1989 [1841]). John Lippitt (2000, 149) links
Kierkegaard’s infinite absolute negativity to Wayne Booth’s concept of “unstable irony”
(1974, 240), a nihilistic attitude which refuses to affirm anything. Kierkegaard discerns this
attitude in Socrates, whom he therefore dismissed “as a self-centred and politically apathetic
figure” (Söderquist 2007, 82), rejecting “earnestness about anything” (Frazier 2006, 114).
The moral suspicion that irony equals political apathy also permeates cultural criticism.
Roger Rosenblatt famously hoped that the “horror” of 9/11 “could spell the end of the age of
irony” (2001). According to Rosenblatt, the American public sphere was characterised by
“detachment and personal whimsy”, which meant that “even the most serious things were not
to be taken seriously” (2001). Yet, a decade later, Christy Wampole still decried that “irony is
the ethos of our age” (2012). For Wampole, irony is a “self-defensive mode” of “dissimula-
tion” through which hipsters and other white middle-class Millennials “dodge responsibility
for [their] choices” (2012). Especially after the election of Donald Trump, Wampole strongly
urged to abandon irony in favour of sincerity and seriousness (2016). Her plea shares the
aspirations for a new sincerity or post-ironic society first advanced by David Foster Wallace
(1993).
Cultural critics and philosophers often associate irony with morally undesirable qualities,
including apathy, cynicism, detachment, dissimulation, nihilism, and whimsy. They similarly
dissociate irony from morally desirable qualities like earnestness, commitment, responsibility,
and seriousness. In defiance of these suspicions, Lear argues that cultivating a capacity for
irony is really “an expression of earnestness and commitment” (2011, 38). He therefore
dismisses the usual moral suspicions about irony as misplaced concerns about “a derivative
form” (2011, 9). According to Lear, “[w]e tend to think casually of “the ironist” as someone
who is able to make certain forms of witty remarks, perhaps saying the opposite of what he
means, of remaining detached by undercutting any manifestation of seriousness” (2011, 9).
Following the later Kierkegaard (and his pseudonyms), Lear dismisses this routine under-
standing by claiming that “[i]rony is an existence-determination, so nothing is more ridiculous
than to suppose it to be a figure of speech” (Johannes Climacus, cited in Lear 2011, XIII).
Revisiting the example of a teacher who deploys their capacity for ironic disruption, Lear
acknowledges that they may appear detached, because they radically doubt that received ideas
about teaching (such as marking essays) contribute to being a ‘teacher’ (2011, 19). Yet, Lear
urges that irony really involves “detachment” from the received social understandings of a
practical identity “to facilitate attachment to the more robust version of the ideal” (2011, 38).
For Lear, the routine understanding of irony is a weak derivative of the genuine article because
it is “deaf to the uncanny disruptions of would-be directedness” (2011, 38). However, because
Lear’s account differs so radically from routine understandings of irony, it is unclear that he
has really attenuated common suspicions. Sceptics (including myself) may worry that Lear
identifies an altogether different, much rarer phenomenon than irony.
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3 What Is Irony?
‘Irony’ can refer to multiple phenomena, which is why philosophers and critics risk equivo-
cating on its meaning or unduly stretch its extension. Concretely, Bernstein worries that Lear’s
departure from routine understandings of irony is “so radical that he opens himself up to the
charge that he is simply changing the subject” – especially because “for Lear, irony has
(essentially) nothing to do with language” (2016, 37–38). To establish greater clarity, I outline
four main types of irony: situational irony (an experience), the irony relevant to moral
evaluation (an attitude), communicative irony (a rhetorical trope) and dramatic irony (a
narrative technique). I identify Lear’s ironic disruption as a peripheral form of situational
irony which is unrelated to the phenomenon that commonly invites moral suspicion. I also
attenuate those common moral suspicions by introducing an alternative account, which frames
existentially relevant irony as an offshoot of communicative irony.
Situational irony “requires a contrast between a norm or expectation or ambition on the one
hand and reality on the other” (Currie 2011, 164). This contrast is hard to define but involves
an experience of the universe frustrating human affairs in a seemingly planned and perversely
perfect way. For example, there is no inherent irony about receiving unemployment benefits,
but it is ironic when exactly that person who has always fulminated against benefits now
depends on them for their livelihood. Another classic example of situational irony is a person
who worked hard all their life, only to die the day before retiring. Lear’s experience of uncanny
disruption can be charitably framed as a peripheral kind of situational irony.
For Lear, irony involves the experience of a “gap” between the received under-
standing and implied ideal of a practical identity (2011, 11). Such a gap arguably
involves the perversely perfect contrast that characterises situational irony. For exam-
ple, the marketization of higher education may feel deeply ironic to a university
lecturer for whom being a ‘teacher’ always seemed to involve critical thinking about
society, including capitalism. Nevertheless, erotic uncanniness, the defining feature of
Lear’s irony, is unrelated to situational irony. A grieving child, who ponders their
father’s death on the day of his pension, may well think it is ironic but does not
experience “an inchoate intimation” of human excellence (2011, 11).
Hence, Lear’s uncanny disruption is differentiated by a characteristic which is not a
standard feature of irony. Therefore, uncanny disruption is at best a special kind of situational
irony. Moreover, historically, the routine understanding of situational irony is not derived from
ironic disruption, because erotic uncanniness is not part of irony’s etymology (see Bernstein
2016, 2). Still, Lear may argue that routine understandings of irony are “diminished” because
less profound than uncanny disruption (2011, 38). This is a plausible argument. Yet, it does
not change the fact that Lear’s erotic uncanniness is a peripheral form of irony, defined by
characteristics which only he considers central to irony. Although this concession does not
problematize the content of Lear’s account (for such a challenge, see section 4), it does mean
his proposal does not resolve common suspicions about irony.
Pace Lear, when philosophers and cultural critics worry about irony, they do not worry
about an experience (of a contrast between ideal and reality), but about an attitude (of
detachment). Yet, like Lear, they rarely address what exactly makes this attitude ironic. To
redress this problem, I propose that for some attitude to be ironic, it must share an attitudinal
quality with communicative irony. This link has been overlooked, mostly because philoso-
phers and cultural critics who are interested in the moral and existential dimensions of irony
have typically not engaged with debates about communicative irony. Hence, philosophers like
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Lear tend to have an obsolete understanding of communicative irony as “saying the opposite of
what one means” (2011, 6).
However, there is now a consensus that “what irony conveys is not a figurative meaning but
an attitude”, specifically dissociation from an unreasonable perspective (Sperber and Wilson
2012, 141; see also Currie 2006, 112–113). Irony can be jovial, playful, biting, or caustic (see
Hutcheon 1985, 45), but it always involves dissociation from a thought attributed to a certain
target. Ironic communication is a kind of stancetaking, whereby language users express a
dissociative stance in relation to a proposition (see Burgers et al. 2011, 305). Therefore, I
propose that for an attitude to be called ‘irony’, it must involve such dissociative stancetaking.
There are currently two main rival theories of communicative irony, the echoic theory
(Sperber and Wilson 2012) and the pretence theory (Currie 2011). Both theories agree that
communicative irony is essentially the expression of a dissociative attitude toward a perspec-
tive but disagree about the mechanics behind this process. Suppose I mock a colleague’s
suggestion by ironically saying “That’s a great idea!” According to the echoic theory of irony,
I do not communicate that thought as my own, but instead tacitly attribute it to my colleague,
in order to tacitly dissociate myself from it (by implying that I find the idea ridiculous). By
contrast, on the pretence theory, I do not engage in a sincere speech act, but only pretend to
assert this defective viewpoint, to ridicule my colleague who genuinely occupies a similar
perspective. In both cases, ironic communication is implicit, and my colleague is left to infer
my dissociative attitude.
Of the two rival theories, the pretence theory seems particularly suited to clarify what
makes certain morally suspicious attitudes ironic. As discussed, cultural critics and philoso-
phers often associate irony with a detached and whimsical attitude devoid of sincerity, and
pretence is often associated with insincerity. Bernard Williams argues that “a sincere assertion
will be one made by someone who himself believes that P” while “an insincere assertor (…)
pretends to express his belief” (2002, 57). Williams highlights that this characterisation also
applies to ironic communication (2002, 57). These connections reveal a conceptual kinship, if
not confusion, between irony, pretence, and insincerity, which also characterises debates about
morally suspicious irony. This confusion needs to be untangled to bring greater clarity to the
moral evaluation of irony.
First, even if irony really involves pretence, not all morally suspicious pretence is ironic.
Consider ironically liking a music genre, which would involve pretending to like that genre, as
a targeted act of dissociation from those that genuinely do like it. Hence, ironically liking a
genre of music is not the same as inauthentically indulging in unsophisticated music choices
(by pretending not to really enjoy them). In this respect, the Dutch and Flemish radio station
QMusic regularly hosts Foute Parties, where people enjoy music genres that would otherwise
be considered a faux pas (i.e. ‘fout’). Such behaviour is not strictly speaking ironic, because it
is not in the first place targeted at people who genuinely like that music (see Currie 2006,
116ff). Instead, it is an insincere form of aesthetic appreciation, which permits people to
indulge in music genres they cannot sincerely like, for fear of social marginalization.
The same goes for indulging in other taboo tastes, like racist humour. For example, ‘hipster
racism’ is typically decried as kind of irony indulged in by “white, often progressive people
who think they are hip to racism, which they mistakenly believe gives them permission to say
and do racist things without actually being racist” (Rachel Dubrofsky in Mahdawi 2017).
Imagine someone who knows why dressing up in blackface for a party is wrong, but does it
anyway, because they profess that their knowingness excuses their behaviour as simply ‘joking
around’. When criticized, they might defend their actions by claiming that they were just
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‘being ironic’. Such behaviour is certainly morally problematic, but to be ironic, it must
involve more than just a flippant and knowing attitude about racism. Instead, real irony would
be targeted at people who are serious about racism – which is still morally problematic, but at
least involves genuinely taking a stand on a political issue.
A related case is a specific kind of online trolling which disavows its actual intent. It is a
strategy among the alt-right to distribute racist memes under the motto of provoking backlash
from progressive critics, who are ridiculed for failing to see that the content was ‘ironic’.
Nevertheless, these memes are genuinely racist, and the professed dissimulation serves to
create a greater tolerance for alt-right ideologies by making it acceptable to endorse them
‘ironically’ (Marwick and Lewis 2015, 1). Such activity may also cause so-called “irony
poisoning”, as in the case of a German man who ended up trying to burn down the house of a
refugee after ‘ironically’ exchanging racist memes (Fisher and Taub 2018). Such attitudes are
certainly dangerous but not ironic simply because they involve communication which pro-
fesses not to endorse its literal message or conceals its actual intent. If such attitudes are
sometimes ironic, it only when they involve an active dissociation from those who find such
content repellent (like progressives who do not find racism funny).
Hence, some attitudes which are morally suspicious because insincere are sometimes too
quickly or even mistakenly labelled as ironic. Such conflation unduly fuels moral suspicion
about irony. Perhaps the association with pretence facilitates such undue extension or makes
irony appear more insincere than it really is. Still, although the rival echoic theory outlines an
understanding of irony that is divorced from pretence, it is not altogether incompatible with
inauthenticity. Somebody who constantly echoes defective tastes and behaviours tacitly
attributed to somebody else, without affirming their own values, certainly does not live an
authentic life. Worries that too much irony is morally problematic are therefore justified.
Nevertheless, if ironic attitudes are reframed as an offshoot of communicative irony, it should
be clear they are not by default morally suspicious.
In fact, irony can and has been put to philosophical use. Consider Voltaire’s Candide, the
great Enlightenment satire of Leibnizian optimism. Candide cultivates a complex irony which
I call ‘ironic characters’. Ironic characters are a ploy in the ironic communication of authors by
asserting viewpoints in a fictional world which audiences are cued to understand as similar to
deficient viewpoints held by real people. They typically serve a satirical function in an author’s
critique of some unreasonable perspective. Most importantly, they can be virtuously integrated
into a legitimate philosophical project, as Voltaire demonstrates in his philosophical critique of
Leibniz.
One ironic character, which Voltaire introduces, is Professor Pangloss, who purports that
“things cannot be otherwise than as they are; for all being created for an end, all is necessarily
for the best end” (1918 [1759], 2). Pangloss supports this argument with questionable
observations like “the nose has been formed to bear spectacles—thus we have spectacles”
and “[l]egs are visibly designed for stockings—and we have stockings” (Voltaire 1918 [1759],
2–3). Although it remains implicit in Candide, Pangloss is clearly a stand-in for Leibniz and
his optimism that God has created the best of all possible worlds. Using ironic characters like
Pangloss, Voltaire dissociates himself from what he considers Leibniz’s absurd optimism.
Below, I argue that such dissociative stancetaking through ironic characters can be virtuously
used to mediate disruption in our moral lives. To understand why, we first need to inspect
more closely how ironic characters function as irony.
Ironic characters are similar to, but ultimately different from, another main type of irony,
i.e. dramatic irony. According to Gregory Currie, dramatic irony involves the fictional
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representation of situational irony (2006, 127–128). It is a narrative technique through which
audiences are given access to salient information lacked by some character in a fiction, who, as
a result of lacking that information, acts in a way that undermines their aspirations in a
perversely perfect manner. A canonical example of dramatic irony is Oedipus’s search (in
Oedipus Rex) for the murderer of King Laius, which the audience knows is himself. Dramatic
irony is also often exploited for comic purposes, as in Shakespeare’s Much Ado About
Nothing, in which the audience has an overview of how the various characters aim to deceive
each other, which they themselves lack.
Similarly, while Pangloss is unaware of the deficiency of his beliefs, the audience are in the
know. Yet, while characters who are victim to dramatic irony are the sole butt of the joke (in
the fiction), ironic characters like Pangloss tacitly put audiences in mind of real-life targets
from whom the author tacitly dissociates themselves. In Oedipus Rex, the only victim of irony
is Oedipus himself, while the real target of Voltaire’s irony is ultimately not Pangloss, but
Leibniz. Hence, ironic characters showcase the tacit attribution and dissociation essential to
communicative irony, which characters oblivious to dramatic irony lack. Moreover, audiences
are supposed to get that Pangloss is intentionally designed by Voltaire to express thoughts
which contrast with their own thoughts about real affairs. By contrast, for dramatic irony,
audiences only need to grasp a contrast between their knowledge about the fictional world and
the internal perspectives of characters.
For these reasons, unlike dramatic irony, ironic characters are a proper extension of
communicative irony, because they serve as ploys in the ironic communication of their
authors. Crucially, the narrative structure of ironic characters is incompatible with the kind
of pretence stipulated by the pretence theory, which is why the echoic theory ultimately affords
a better understanding of communicative irony. On the pretence theory, “the pretence that is
fundamental to irony is not a pretence of doing; it’s a pretence of being. In pretending to assert
or whatever, one pretends to be a certain kind of person—a person with a restricted or
otherwise defective view of the world or some part of it” (Currie 2006, 116). The idea is that
“the most efficient way for an ironic speaker to criticize the foolishness of people is not only to
pretend to behave in a foolish manner but to pretend to be a foolish person” (Popa-Wyatt 2014,
138, original emphasis).
This kind of pretence of being is not compatible with what Voltaire is doing in Candide.
Consider again Pangloss, who argues that “[p]igs were made to be eaten—therefore we eat
pork all the year round. Consequently, they who assert that all is well have said a foolish thing,
they should have said all is for the best” (Voltaire 1918 [1759], 3). Although this sentence is
uttered by Pangloss, it is really written by Voltaire to put readers in mind of Leibnizian
optimism, from which he dissociates himself. On the pretence theory, Voltaire must therefore
pretend to be someone with a deficient viewpoint. Clearly, as the author of Candide, Voltaire
does not pretend to be Pangloss, or indeed any other character in the fiction. He also cannot
pretend to be someone outside the fiction who asserts these viewpoints, because it is Pangloss
who does the asserting in the fiction.
Nevertheless, Voltaire could pretend to be an author who endorses the deficient thoughts
asserted by Pangloss, or at least fails to see their deficiency. This option involves what Currie
calls a “second author”, whereby an author makes it “fictional that someone other than herself
is the author of [a] fictional story” (2010, 70–71). However, this solution inadequately captures
the successful uptake of ironic characters, which involves what Wayne Booth calls a “secret
communion” between author and reader (1983, 300). Booth explains that “[i]n the irony with
which we are concerned, the speaker [in a narrative fiction] is himself the butt of the ironic
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point. The author and reader are secretly in collusion, behind the speaker’s back, agreeing
upon the standard by which he is found wanting” (1983, 304). The second-author solution
falters in the case of Candide, because Voltaire is really in a secret communion with audiences
behind the back of Pangloss (who asserts the deficient viewpoints), not behind the back of
some imaginary author (who endorses them).
By contrast, whereas the pretence theory fails to explain the successful uptake of ironic
characters, the echoic theory can easily explain why Voltaire’s communication is ironic.
Voltaire echoes Leibniz’s thoughts by creating a fiction in which Pangloss endorses thoughts
that are similar in content to Leibniz’s. Voltaire’s communicative act is tacit because it remains
implicit that he really attributes Pangloss’s thoughts to Leibniz. Moreover, Voltaire also does
not explicitly state that he really dissociates himself from those thoughts. The audience are left
to infer the real meaning of Voltaire’s utterance. For this reason, an undiscerning reader or
someone unfamiliar with Leibniz’s optimism might miss the irony altogether. These charac-
teristics of ironic characters are prototypical of communicative irony and can easily be
explained by the echoic theory.
Ironic characters testify to irony’s complexity and its meritorious contributions to a
philosophical project like Voltaire’s critique of Leibnizian optimism. The philosophical
legitimacy of Candide proves that the dissociative stancetaking of irony is not by default
detached dissimulation. In this respect, it is particularly puzzling that Lear ascribes the
prevalence of moral suspicion to “the tendency in the culture to treat irony as satire” (2011,
119). Clearly, satire like Voltaire’s Candide is hardly a pinnacle of detachment and whimsy.
Moreover, the use of ironic characters in satire, as dissociation from absurd ideals, can serve as
a uniquely valuable response to disruption in our moral lives. To understand why, we must
consider how the disruption of moral imperfection sometimes prevents us from achieving
human excellence.
4 Ironic Characters and Moral Imperfection
It is not merely the case that Lear’s uncanny disruption is a peripheral form of irony; I also
doubt that it (always) orients us toward human excellence. Concretely, there are occasions of
disruption when erotic uncanniness cannot orient us toward excellence in our practical identity
because it would clash with achieving excellence in another practical identity. Such disruption,
which follows from value incompatibility, is unavoidable in our moral lives and can cause
mental suffering. To sustain mental wellbeing, we need to accept our limits in achieving
human excellence, i.e. our moral imperfection. Ironic characters can play a virtuous role in this
process by offering us emotional distance which soothes mental suffering. Specifically, the
dissociative stancetaking inherent in ironic characters can be put to virtuous use in negotiating
a mean between too much disruption (a complete breakdown of practical deliberation in face
of one’s imperfection) and too little disruption (complete insensitivity toward one’s
imperfection).
The disruption of value incompatibility arises when the values embedded in multiple
practical identities clash. Valerie Tiberius explains that “[i]f my conception of how to live
requires doing everything I can to prevent extreme suffering and paying special attention to my
friends and family, then I will never be in a position to reflect on my life and assess that I am
meeting all of my own standards, or even coming close to it” (2008, 179). In other words, I
may experience disruption because my values and obligations as a parent clash with my
Irony, Disruption and Moral Imperfection 553
commitments as a volunteer. Such value incompatibility causes the kind of disruption de-
scribed by Lear, because we experience our attempts as so woefully inadequate that we are
unsure what it would even mean to be both a ‘parent’ and ‘volunteer’.
Pace Lear, such disruption does not inherently reorient us toward excellence, because being
excellent as a parent is to some extent incompatible with being excellent as a volunteer. Sure,
we can be a parent and a volunteer. However, we do not have the resources to be both the best
‘parent’ and best ‘volunteer’ we can be (especially if also try to be the best ‘friend’,
‘colleague’, or ‘pianist’ we can be). There is no immediate solution to this problem. We must
therefore learn to “live with the conflict, recognizing that one’s conception of a good life
[including harmony between one’s values] cannot be fully realized in the world as it unfor-
tunately happens to be” (Tiberius 2008, 179). Yet, living such a life is easier said than done,
which is why we need to find a “strategy for coping with an imperfect world” (Tiberius 2008,
180).
Ironic characters in satire can serve as exactly such a strategy for coping with the disruption
of value incompatibility, specifically to distance ourselves from an otherwise destructive ideal
of moral perfectionism. Consider a cartoon by Andy Singer (2004, 123), in which he not only
uses ironic characters to ridicule the absurdly defective viewpoints of a self-made business-
woman, arms dealer, and army general, but equally to mock a fictional satirist who is
convinced that he is emancipating the world (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 We all adopt philosophies that justify our lifestyles
D. Declercq554
The fictional satirist is clearly a stand-in for Singer himself – or, more precisely, the part of
his personality that is prone to pursue an unattainable moral ideal. Aspiring to this unattainable
moral ideal is unhealthy, as is clear from signifiers of mental ill health, like the wild hair, blank
stare, and inane grin.
Singer’s self-irony serves to address a disruption acknowledged by many satirists. Fellow
cartoonist Dan Perkins (aka Tom Tomorrow) acknowledges that “[y]ou have to want to save
the world in order to get up every day and do this work [satire], but in order to maintain your
sanity, you simultaneously have to understand that you’re just not going to” (Rall 2002, 28).
Perkins’s remark exhibits a kind of irony which resembles Lear’s uncanny disruption. In this
respect, ‘satirist’ is a practical identity which is defined by the aspiration to expose social
wrongness with an eye to its termination. Yet, there is no conceivable way of creating satire
that could ever fully live up to that aspiration, which causes disruption. For what is a ‘satirist’,
if not someone fully committed to change the world?
Pace Lear, this disruption does not orient the reflexive satirist toward achieving excellence
in a way which surpasses received understandings of being a ‘satirist’. Rather, the point is
exactly that the practical identity of the reflexive satirist is disrupted because they can never
live up to the moral ideals that define that very identity. The disruption experienced by the
reflexive satirist follows from an incompatibility between moral value (the care for others) and
prudential value (the care of self). As Blackburn puts it, “[w]e simply cannot shoulder the
burden of the entire world” (1998, 221), which is why “[w]e need and cherish spheres within
which we are completely absorbed by private concern and emotion” (1998, 22). The fictional
satirist in Singer’s cartoon is unable to make that concession and acknowledge his moral
imperfection, which causes mental ill health.
Singer’s fictional cartoonist no doubt suffers from ‘neurotic perfectionism’. A neurotic
perfectionist “compare[s] their values with inaccessible goals” (Geranmayepoura and Besharat
2010, 634). Therefore, neurotic perfections are never satisfied with their achievements and
constantly feel guilty and shameful about “their alleged underachievements” (Stoeber et al.
2007, 131). In this respect, Blackburn acknowledges that moral deliberation has gone awry
when it becomes “obsessive and neurotic” and when people are “destroyed by neurotic and
obsessive misplaced guilt (…) and the feeling of having let themselves or others down, when
no such feelings are appropriate” (1998, 16). It is exactly from such moral obsession and
neuroticism that Singer dissociates himself through self-representation as an ironic character.
A similar process of ironic dissociation characterises the representation of Chidi Anagonye,
a fictional ethics professor in the American comedy series The Good Place (2016-2019). Chidi
finds himself in an afterlife that is loosely modelled on Christian eschatology. At the start,
Chidi believes he has made it to the titular ‘good place’, because he always tried to make the
morally perfect choice. Yet, Chidi’s moral conscientiousness is also his tragic flaw because he
is painfully aware of all the consequences of his decisions. As a result, Chidi’s moral
deliberation is so neurotic and obsessive that it becomes completely unsuccessful. Chidi can
never reach a decision and, unable to identify the perfect moral action, he does not act at all (or
incessantly postpones).
This complete breakdown of practical deliberation is Chidi’s ultimate undoing. Failing to
find the perfect bar for a drink with his best friend, Chidi remains frozen on the pavement for
thirty minutes, until an air conditioner unit falls from a window and hits him straight on the
head. Chidi’s troubling experiences in the afterlife ultimately make him realize that he is in the
‘bad place’, where tormented souls experience psychological torture equivalent to their
character flaws. In Chidi’s case, what really makes the bad place so bad is that he constantly
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has to make decisions, which permanently gives him a stomach ache. In other words, because
of his moral perfectionism, Chidi experiences mental suffering and a complete breakdown of
practical deliberation.
What Chidi lacks to dissociate himself from his moral perfectionism is a sense of practical
wisdom, which the makers of The Good Place do exhibit in their representation of him as an
ironic character. According to James E. Birren and Lauren M. Fisher, “[w]isdom seems to
emerge as a dialectic that, on one pole, is bounded by the transcendence of limitations and, on
the other, by their acceptance” (1990, 324). Similarly, Positive Psychologists identify wisdom
as a matter of the right “perspective” (Peterson and Seligman 2004, 181). This right perspec-
tive involves a degree of self-acceptance and acceptance of unchangeable circumstances,
which are commonly advocated as strategies to prevent mental health issues like stress,
anxiety, and depression (NHS Staff 2018a, 2018b). In this regard, wisdom as a character
virtue correlates with the absence of neuroticism (Staudinger et al. 1997).
Ironic characters, like Chidi or Singer’s fictional satirist, are a manifestation of such
practical wisdom. Their representation involves a dissociative stancetaking from moral per-
fectionism, which frames it as absurdly defective. Concretely, through the ironic character of
the fictional satirist, Singer comes to terms with his limitations in changing the world. In the
absence of such a coping strategy, he is bound to damage his wellbeing and decision-making
(as the example of Chidi shows). Hence, for Singer, ironic dissociation from his inner
perfectionist creates just the right amount of distance from debilitating moral perfectionism
to continue creating satire.
The idea that irony can appropriately distance us from unavoidable limitations is not
entirely new. Pierre Hadot refers to Socratic irony as a coping strategy for epistemic imper-
fection, calling it “a kind of humor which refuses to take oneself or other people entirely
serious” (2002, 25). Similarly, to deal with absurd uncertainty about whether our values
matter, Thomas Nagel advises that “we return to our familiar convictions with a certain irony
and resignation” (2012 [1979], 20). Likewise, Wilhelm Schmid argues that irony helps us deal
with insoluble existential contrarieties by enabling us to reassess ourselves and our circum-
stances from an external viewpoint, which puts them in perspective (1998, 376). These ideas
echo Lear’s argument that irony can reorient us in response to disruption of practical identity.
However, pace Lear, irony does not reorient us toward human excellence, but dissociates us
from a debilitating ideal of human excellence, i.e. moral perfectionism.
At the same time, Schmid also identifies the “dangers” of too much dissociation, specif-
ically “the habit of the subject to resign in unbearable contrarieties and only ironise them” and
thus “never speak seriously anymore, show no spine, support nothing, so that everything goes”
(1998, 380, my translation). This is the kind of irony that philosophers and cultural critics are
worried about because it echoes moral commitment only to dismiss it as ridiculous. (Values?
Yeah right.) Such irony typically constitutes an attempt to flippantly deflect disappointment in
response to suffering that cannot be abated. It distances us from our moral imperfection
altogether and makes us morally apathetic. Hence, what is required is a virtuous irony that
strikes the right balance between too little disruption (complete insensitivity) and too much
disruption (complete breakdown of practical deliberation).
Ironic characters in arts and media are uniquely valuable because they provide a clearly
developed example of how we can cultivate such a virtuous irony. The aesthetic appreciation
of ironic characters requires “narrative thinking”, which involves understanding and appreci-
ating “divergences” between perspectives, for example between perspectives of characters
internal to the story, or between the internal perspective of a character and the external
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perspective of the author, etc. (Goldie 2012, 30). Specifically, to engage with an ironic
character like Chidi, we must understand and appreciate that his perspective is defective and
diverges from the reasonable perspective of The Good Place’s writers. Crucially, we can adopt
this process of narrative thinking and put it to virtuous use in our moral lives.
Specifically, we can learn to cope with the disruption of value incompatibility and moral
imperfection by dissociating ourselves from a neurotically perfectionist version of ourselves.
Doing so, we dissociate ourselves frommoral perfectionism, by appreciating how defective we
would be if we really were like Chidi or Singer’s fictional satirist. This strategy builds on the
ordinary role of narrative thinking in practical deliberation. Peter Goldie explains how we
often think through our thoughts and actions from an external perspective to guide our
reflection about the past and planning for the future (2004, 109–111). He explains how such
narrative thinking about ourselves is characterised by an ironic gap; reflecting on the ignorant
beliefs we held as a teenager, we now feel a certain amusement at the expense of our previous
self, which guides us to make more enlightened choices in the future (Goldie 2012, 56).
Such narrative thinking about our previous self is identical to reorienting our practical
deliberation by getting to see ourselves as ‘such a Chidi’ in situations where our moral ideals
risk suffocating us. Goldie explains that fictional characters like Chidi often serve as a resource
in our practical identity; we think of ourselves as “a loser like Marilyn Monroe’s Sugar Kane in
Some Like It Hot; a loner like the James Coburn character in The Magnificent Seven; a lover
like Jack Nicholson in Carnal Knowledge (2004, 116). Similarly, Hilde Lindemann argues
that “[p]ersonal identities consist of a connective tissue of narratives” and “many contain stock
plots and character types that are borrowed from narratives that circulate widely in the culture”
(2001, 72). Therefore, what makes ironic characters in popular media uniquely valuable is that
we can adopt and adapt them in our narrative thinking to cope with the disruption of value
incompatibility and moral imperfection.
5 Conclusion
According to Lear, irony functions as an Aristotelian virtue, holding a “mean between excess
and defect” (2011, 32). Similarly, I have argued that whereas too much irony leads to moral
apathy, too little irony leads to moral neuroticism and mental ill health. Yet, I have challenged
Lear’s conception of irony as an experience of uncanny disruption which orients us toward
human excellence. Not only is Lear’s understanding of irony too idiosyncratic to alleviate
common moral suspicions about irony, his account also overlooks the disruption of value
incompatibility, which does not reorient us toward human excellence, but instead confronts us
with our moral imperfection. Introducing ironic characters, I have outlined how a complex
form of communicative irony can be put to virtuous use by helping us cope with the
unavoidable disruption of imperfection in our moral lives.
My proposal attenuates common moral suspicions about irony in arts and media by
showing how an ironic strategy can contribute to sustaining mental wellbeing and healthy
practical deliberation in the face of disruptive value incompatibility. Moreover, formulating
effective coping strategies in response to such disruption has never been more pressing. While
value incompatibility is of all ages, it is intensified by increased knowledge about the
consequences of our actions, which can cause clashes between values embedded in our
different practical identities. In this respect, global information technology has made us often
painfully aware that our aspirations to be the best possible ‘friend’, ‘colleague’, or ‘pianist’ can
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make us indirectly contribute to climate change or social injustice. We now have no way of not
knowing about the cost of flying across the world to attend to our ill friend’s needs or deliver
that prestigious piano recital. To sustain good mental health and successful practical deliber-
ation in this environment with increased opportunities for disruption, we need coping strategies
like ironic characters more than ever.
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